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r Vincent C. Immel Professor of Law Emeritus, Saint Louis University School of Law. Thanks to Professors Mark D. Rosen, Christopher Schmidt, and Carolyn Shapiro for the invitation to participate in this
Symposium. Having learned from their work over the years, it was a privilege to be part of this important
volume. Thanks, too, to Kathleen Casey and Matthew Tuegel of the Vincent C. Immel Library at Saint
Louis University School of Law for the wonderful assistance they characteristically provided.
1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur . . . .”).
2. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[H]e shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent
of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme
Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided
for, and which shall be established by Law . . . .”).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (“The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments . . . .”).
4. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 226 (1993).
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The Constitution entrusts the United States Senate with special responsibility. In addition to its normal legislative functions, the Senate plays distinctive roles in treaty formation1 and in confirming officers of the executive
and judicial branches.2 And the Constitution gives the Senate “the sole power
to try impeachments,” including in those rare and historic occasions when
the House of Representatives impeaches a President of the United States.3
Not only does the Senate conduct the trial without participation of the House
of Representatives, its work is also not subject to review by the federal judiciary.4 The roles assigned to the Senate, especially the last, reflect the high
confidence the Constitution reposes in Congress’s upper chamber. The
Framers recognized the risk that members of a political body would allow
partisan loyalties to interfere with the impartial judgment that was required
for the impeachment remedy to have meaning. Yet they thought the structure
and composition of the Senate and the character of its members would mitigate against such misbehavior.
The Constitution’s aspirations for the Senate were frustrated during the
impeachment trial of President Donald J. Trump. The conduct of many members of the Senate majority gave little indication that constitutional duty, rather than partisan considerations, motivated their behavior. Some members
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failed to demonstrate the type of impartial official behavior on which the
Constitution depends, especially in unusual moments like presidential impeachment trials. Although cynics might insist that partisans will be partisans
and accordingly dismiss as unrealistic any aspirations that senators and others would rise above party to act in a dispassionate and objective manner, the
Constitution depends on and adopts a more optimistic assessment of official
and citizen behavior. That constitutional expectation is not an impossible
dream. On the contrary, the assumption and possibility of such objective conduct can be found in two constitutional processes that bear important resemblances to presidential impeachment.
The standard of public behavior was articulated repeatedly by former
Attorney General Herbert Brownell more than one-half century ago when
Congress considered a vexing problem somewhat like impeachment and removal, namely how to devise procedures to allow decision-makers other than
the President to separate a disabled President from the powers and duties of
his office. Brownell provided the insight that in such crisis situations, the
Constitution assumed and depended on what he called “constitutional morality” or “constitutional propriety,” the idea that in crisis situations public
officials and citizens would elevate constitutional norms and national interests over partisan considerations.5 Although history has not yet presented
episodes of constitutional morality in such presidential inability decisionmaking, it has furnished a contemporary instance in a different context somewhat analogous to presidential impeachment trials, namely when the Senate
must consider expelling a member. The behavior of Senator Thomas F. Eagleton (D. Mo.) and Senator Bill Bradley (D. N.J.) in the 1982 Senate expulsion proceeding against Senator Harrison Williams (D. N.J.) illustrates the
possibility of such constitutional morality, and their conduct presented a
model of public service the current Senate majority would have been well
advised to study and follow.
This short essay begins by outlining the Constitution’s aspirations for
the Senate in a presidential impeachment trial. It then develops the idea of
constitutional morality as Brownell presented it in the analogous context of
presidential inability. It will then describe the conduct of Eagleton and Bradley as examples of constitutional morality before suggesting some conclusions regarding the role of the Senate in the Trump impeachment trial.
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I. THE SENATE AND PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT
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6. U.S. Const. art. II, §4.
7. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 552 (Max Farrand ed. 1911).
The placement of the Clause in Article II is also suggestive.
8. Id. at 550–52.
9. Id. at 499, 550.
10. Id. at 550.
11. FRANK O. BOWMAN, III, HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS: A HISTORY OF IMPEACHMENT
FOR THE AGE OF TRUMP 40 (2019).
12. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 7, at 550.
13. Id. at 550. The word “State” was replaced by “United States” by unanimous vote the same day.
Id. at 551.
14. BOWMAN, supra note 11, at 103.
15. Id. at 103–11.
16. CHARLES L. BLACK, Jr., Impeachment: A Handbook 30 (1974).
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The Constitution’s Framers regarded impeachment as an indispensable
check on presidential behavior. They intended impeachment and removal to
address not simply the rare instances where Presidents, Vice Presidents, or
other civil officers engaged in treason and bribery, but also instances where
they committed “other high crimes and misdemeanors.” 6 The latter phrase
was a catchall intended to encompass a broad range of constitutional offenses.
The final discussions in Philadelphia focused on presidential impeachment since the Impeachment Clause was not broadened to include the Vice
President and other civil officers 7 until after the Convention debated and approved its basic terms as applicable to the President. 8 The Framers resisted
the proposal of the Committee of Eleven on September 4, 1787, which limited impeachable conduct to “treason or bribery.” 9 George Mason objected
to that narrow limitation since “[t]reason” would not “reach many great and
dangerous offenses” such as the offenses Warren Hastings, 10 the British
Governor-General of India, had been impeached for in May of 1787, shortly
before the Philadelphia Convention began.11 Mason initially proposed to add
“maladministration,” but James Madison feared that formulation would authorize the Senate to oust a President over policy disagreements. 12 Mason
then replaced “maladministration” with “other high crimes and misdemeanors against the state” and that version passed, eight states to three.13 The term
adopted, Frank Bowman concludes, “was, by design, a flexible concept” 14
which covered a wide range of official misconduct. 15 Although the term did
not make the President or other civil officers vulnerable to ouster due to policy differences, 16 a consequence which would have resembled the parliamentary arrangements the Constitution rejected, it clearly encompassed
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constitutional offenses which abused a public trust 17 whether the conduct
constituted an indictable crime or not. The impeachment proceeding would
provide Congress “an essential check in the hands of that body upon the encroachments of the executive,” 18 language which makes clear that “other
high crimes and misdemeanors” included constitutional trespasses and
which rebuts the argument that a crime or criminal-like offense was required.
The overwhelming consensus among constitutional law scholars who have
studied the subject finds that impeachable offenses are not limited to indictable crimes and include abuse of power. 19
To attack the use of impeachment as upsetting the results of a presidential election, of course, wholly mischaracterizes the constitutional structure.
The Framers included the remedy in the Constitution as a necessary check
against constitutional offenses. If prior election immunized a President or
Vice President from impeachment, the Constitution would not specifically
subject those officials to the remedy’s reach. Nor does the Constitution exclude impeachments from use during presidential election years. On the contrary, presidential impeachment is appropriate whenever the House of
Representatives determines that a President has committed “treason, bribery
or other high crimes and misdemeanors.” 20
Trying impeachment imposed a responsibility with a “judicial character” 21 and the framers recognized the difficulty of finding an appropriate
“court” to conduct the trial. 22 Justice Joseph Story summarized the challenges facing an impeachment tribunal, writing:

42699-ckt_95-2 Sheet No. 17 Side B
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17. THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other
words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar
propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society
itself.”); Joseph Story, 1 Commentaries on the Constitution § 746, at 520 (2nd ed. 1851) (“The jurisdiction
is to be exercised over offences, which are committed by public men in violation of their public trust and
duties.”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, IMPEACHMENT: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE 56–63, 121–24 (2017) (associating
“high crimes and misdemeanors” with abuses of public trust whether criminal or not).
18. THE FEDERALIST No. 66, supra note 17, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton).
19. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 105 (3rd ed. 2019) (stating that major controversy relates to the range of
nonindictable crimes subject to impeachment); BLACK, supra note 16, at 33, 39 (rejecting the idea that
“other high crimes and misdemeanors” is limited to criminal behavior); SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 56–
63 (concluding that phrase applies to offenses against public even if not indictable crimes); Richard M.
Pious, Impeaching the President: The Intersection of Constitutional and Popular Law, 43 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 859, 862, 866–76 (1999) (explaining that “high crimes and misdemeanors” includes “abuse of power”
and is not limited to indictable crimes); Michael J. Gerhardt, Putting the Law of Impeachment in Perspective, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 905, 906, 913–18 (1999) (summarizing evidence and consensus that phrase is
not limited to indictable crimes).
20. U.S. Const., art. II, §4.
21. THE FEDERALIST No. 65, supra note 17, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton).
22. Id. (“A well-constituted court for the trial of impeachments is an object not more to be desired
than difficult to be obtained in a government wholly elective.”).
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The great objects, to be attained in the selection of a tribunal for the trial
of impeachments, are, impartiality, integrity, intelligence, and independence. If either of these is wanting, the trial must be radically imperfect. To
ensure impartiality, the body must be in some degree removed from popular power and passions, from the influence of sectional prejudice, and
from the more dangerous influence of mere party spirit. To secure integrity, there must be a lofty sense of duty, and a deep responsibility to future
times, as well as to God. 23

11/23/2020 10:40:39

23. Story, supra note 17, § 745, at 520.
24. BLACK, supra note 16, at 10.
25. THE FEDERALIST No. 65, supra note 17, at 398 (Alexander Hamilton).
26. Id.; see also 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 7, at 551
(remarks of Governeur Morris).
27. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 7, at 551.
28. THE FEDERALIST No. 65, supra note 17, at 398–99 (Alexander Hamilton).
29. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 7, at 551.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 552.
32. THE FEDERALIST No. 65, supra note 17, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton).
33. Id.
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Earlier drafts at the Constitutional Convention had empowered the Supreme Court, not the Senate, to conduct impeachment trials, an arrangement
that underscored the impartial, not politically biased, nature of the undertaking. 24 Yet the Framers concluded that the Supreme Court was inadequate for
the assignment. It would lack sufficient credibility to reconcile the public to
a decision contrary to the charge imposed by the House of Representatives.25
Its small size also counseled against its use; such a controversial responsibility should be spread. 26 Roger Sherman thought justices appointed by a President might feel beholden to him and accordingly not act impartially.27
Moreover, the accused might be subject to criminal prosecution in the federal
judiciary. The Supreme Court’s impartiality in the criminal proceeding
would be impaired if it had conducted the impeachment trial. 28
The topic engendered debate in Philadelphia, and some, like Madison
and Charles Pinckney, worried that making the President subject to an impeachment trial by the Senate would make him too dependent on the legislature. 29 But the Convention defeated Madison’s motion to remove the Senate
as trier of impeachments, nine states to two,30 and the Clause, with other
amendments, was approved, ten states to one. 31
Impeachment would address misconduct of public officials, 32 and the
prosecution of such political offenses would inevitably arouse community
“passions” and divide the public, often consistent with “pre-existing factions.” 33 This anticipated tendency presented the “greatest danger” that the
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outcome would turn on party strength rather than on “the real demonstrations
of innocence or guilt,” 34 which Alexander Hamilton clearly thought were the
appropriate criteria. Elected officials might mirror partisan sentiments and
might have their requisite neutrality compromised because of their reflection
of, or association with, the “most numerous faction.” 35
Conducting an impeachment trial was a difficult job but someone had
to do it, and the Framers thought the Senate was the best someone. 36 Since
an impeachment trial was a national inquisition into the conduct of public
officials, the people’s representatives should be the inquisitors.37 The House
of Representatives would determine whether to impeach a public official,
leaving the Senate as the final arbiter. 38
But the Senate did not draw the assignment simply by default. The
Framers thought its qualities best suited it for the difficult trust involved.
“Where else than in the Senate could have been found a tribunal sufficiently
dignified, or sufficiently independent?” 39 wrote Hamilton. The Senate’s stature and the senators’ lengthy elected terms would hopefully allow its members to set aside partisan inclinations to discharge their responsibility with
“the necessary impartiality.” 40
Moreover, the nature of impeachable offenses made the Senate better
suited than a court as the adjudicator. As Justice Joseph Story later explained,
since impeachable offenses addressed a broad range of “political offenses,”
they must be addressed by principles, standards, and customs known to
statesmen, not jurists. Their political preparation would make senators more
competent than judges to assess such behavior. 41
42699-ckt_95-2 Sheet No. 18 Side B
11/23/2020 10:40:39

34. Id. at 396–97.
35. Id. at 397.
36. GERHARDT, supra note 19, at 7 (stating that the Philadelphia convention found that the Senate
presented the fewest problems).
37. THE FEDERALIST No. 65, supra note 17, at 397 (Alexander Hamilton).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 398; see also Story, supra note 17 §775 at 540 (arguing that the Senate is the appropriate
body to try impeachments due to its independence, impartiality and public confidence).
40. See THE FEDERALIST No. 65, supra note 17, at 398 (Alexander Hamilton) (“What other body
would be likely to feel confidence enough in its own situation to preserve, unawed and uninfluenced, the
necessary impartiality between an individual accused, and the representatives of the people, his accusers?”).
41. Story, supra note 17, §764, at 532–33 (“These are so various in their character, and so indefinable in their actual involutions, that it is almost impossible to provide systematically for them by positive
law. They must be examined upon very broad and comprehensive principles of public policy and duty.
They must be judged of by the habits, and rules, and principles of diplomacy, of departmental operations
and arrangements, of parliamentary practice, of executive customs and negotiations, of foreign, as well
as of domestic political movements; and in short, by a great variety of circumstances, as well those, which
aggravate, as those, which extenuate, or justify the offensive acts, which do not properly belong to the
judicial character in the ordinary administration of justice, and are far removed from the reach of municipal jurisprudence. They are duties, which are easily understood by statesmen, and are rarely known to

42699-ckt_95-2 Sheet No. 19 Side A

11/23/2020 10:40:39

GOLDSTEIN MACRO FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

CONSTITUTIONAL MORALITY

10/18/2020 3:25 PM

481

11/23/2020 10:40:39

judges. A tribunal, composed of the former, would therefore be far more competent, in point of intelligence and ability, than the latter, for the discharge of the functions, all other circumstances being equal.
And surely, in such grave affairs, the competency of the tribunal to discharge the duties in the best manner
is an indispensable qualification.”).
42. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 238 (1993).
43. BLACK, supra note 16, at 23–24.
44. Id. at 11.
45. THE FEDERALIST No. 66, supra note 17, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton).
46. Id.
47. GERHARDT, supra note 19, at 10.
48. See Joel K. Goldstein, Constitutional Change, Originalism, and the Vice Presidency, 16 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 369, 383, 386, 389–93 (2013).
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (“When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice
shall preside.”).
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The Supreme Court’s subsequent determination42 that most issues relating to the impeachment trial are political questions committed to the Senate for final resolution was perhaps predictable, but it raised the stakes. The
Court’s conclusion meant that such issues could not be resolved in judicial
proceedings. That determination generally removed any judicial check from
the process and effectively gave the Senate the last word, subject only to its
members’ political accountability. Accordingly, since they had to police
their own behavior, senators had a greater duty to ensure they acted impartially. 43
Yet, as Hamilton pointed out, partisan attachments introduced an intrinsic problem into a proceeding premised on the impartiality of the surrogate
judges and jurors. Many congressmen might find themselves “either definitely friendly or definitely inimical to the president.”44 Disqualification or
recusal was not a viable option since many members might be affected.
The Constitution structured the impeachment remedy to protect the
President against an unfair proceeding. The division of powers between the
House and Senate reduced the likelihood that the President would be persecuted by “a factious spirit” in one of the branches.45 The requirement of a
two-thirds vote in the Senate for conviction afforded the President further
security. 46 The high bar of the super-majority requirement encouraged careful deliberation 47 and reduced the likelihood of conviction and removal. That
formidable obstacle would also deter the House of Representatives from impeaching except in egregious cases. The Vice President, who the framers
anticipated would spend most of his time presiding over the Senate, 48 was
specifically banned from that role during a presidential impeachment trial.49
The rationale was not hard to imagine. As the successor, the Vice President
would have a conflict of interest, so he was excluded to avoid the appearance
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL MORALITY
The idea that public officials could and would overcome partisanship to
rise to special constitutional occasions was implicit in the discussions of
Hamilton and Justice Story and did not disappear with the passing of the

11/23/2020 10:40:39

50. Story, supra note 17, § 777, at 542 (“It was to preclude the vice president, who might be supposed to have a natural desire to succeed to the office, from being instrumental in procuring the conviction
of the chief magistrate.”).
51. BLACK, supra note 16, at 11.
52. Id.
53. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, supra note 17, at 395 (John Jay) (describing the Senate as populated
“by men the most able and the most willing to promote the interests of their constituents.”).
54. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, supra note 17, at 396 (John Jay).
55. GERHARDT, supra note 19, at 10.

42699-ckt_95-2 Sheet No. 19 Side B

or reality of unfairness. 50 The senators were required to take an oath, in addition to the one they took upon entering their positions, which further solemnized an impeachment trial. The presence of the Chief Justice as the
Senate’s presiding officer in a presidential impeachment trial underscored
the magnitude of the event, justifying a rare breach of the general constitutional aversion to officers of one branch functioning in another.
Although constitutional features like the division of power between the
House and the Senate and the two-thirds requirement for conviction gave the
President substantial protection from a politically-motivated removal, the
Constitution was less successful in devising structural provisions to induce
public men and women to disregard partisan pressure to support a President
of their party who had committed a serious abuse of public trust. The Constitution relied on more symbolic features to provide incentives to encourage
the President’s co-partisans to acknowledge an overwhelming case to convict. The oath and presence of the Chief Justice signaled that an impeachment trial did not constitute business as usual. They added solemnity to the
moment and served as reminders that the Senate was entrusted with a judicial, not political/legislative, function.51 Senators must act with “total impartiality, at least resembling that of a faithful judge or juror.”52
Nonetheless, those formalities constituted rather soft admonitions since
they were unaccompanied by any structural enforcement. The Framers expected the Senate to consist of the nation’s most eminent men. 53 John Jay
thought the Constitution had “taken the utmost care” that senators would be
“men of talents, and integrity.” 54 The Framers of the Constitution envisioned
the Senate as consisting of educated and virtuous public citizens who could
“make sound judgments with the nation’s best interests in mind.” 55 Senators
should act as constitutional fiduciaries, not partisans.
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early generations or the change in the manner of electing senators which occurred when the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment 56 in 1913 imposed direct election of senators instead of entrusting that task to state
legislatures. 57 In a different, but related, context, Herbert Brownell, President
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s first Attorney General, addressed the general but
vexing question of motivating public officials to discharge a constitutional
responsibility that cut against their apparent partisan interests. Brownell’s
insights came in a discussion of the problem of how to transfer power from
a disabled President who is unable or unwilling to recognize his own incapacity. Prior to ratification of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, the Constitution
contained no procedures for transferring power from a disabled President to
the Vice President, and some doubt existed whether such a transfer would
oust the President from office permanently rather than simply divesting him
of presidential powers and duties while disabled. The Cold War and advent
of the nuclear age made finding a solution important, and Eisenhower’s three
presidential disabilities drew attention to the problem in the mid-1950s before Congress finally addressed it following the assassination of John F. Kennedy on November 22, 1963. 58
The Eisenhower Administration’s proposed constitutional amendment,
which Brownell supported, called for the Vice President with the concurrence of a majority of the President’s Cabinet to determine the President’s
inability and transfer presidential powers and duties (though not the presidency) to the Vice President. 59 Some were skeptical that those appointed by,
and loyal to, the President would act to declare him disabled; others were
fearful that a President might be improperly declared disabled. During his
1957 testimony before the House of Representatives, Brownell replied:

11/23/2020 10:40:39

56. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
58. Joel K. Goldstein, Taking From the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Lessons in Ensuring Presidential
Continuity, 79 FORD. L. REV. 959, 964-65 (2010).
59. Joel K. Goldstein, The Bipartisan Bayh Amendment: Republican Contributions to the TwentyFifth Amendment, 86 FORD. L. REV. 1137, 1142 (2017).
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More important than any of the written safeguards are those provided by
our political processes, for ultimately the operation of any constitutional
arrangement, depends on public opinion, and upon the public’s processing
a certain sense of constitutional morality.
In the absence of this sense of constitutional morality on the part of the
citizenry, there can be, of course, no guaranty against the usurpation of
power or any coup d’etat. In other words, no mechanical or procedural
solution will provide a complete answer, if one assumes hypothetical cases
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in which most of the parties are rogues and in which no sense of constitutional propriety exists. 60

11/23/2020 10:40:39

60. Presidential Inability: Hearings before the Special Subcomm. On Study of Presidential Inability of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 85th Cong. 31 (1957) (statement of Herbert Brownell, Jr.).
61. Herbert Brownell Jr., Presidential Disability: The Need for a Constitutional Amendment, 68
YALE L.J. 189, 200 (1958).
62. Presidential Inability: Hearings before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 242 (1965)
(statement of Herbert Brownell, Jr.); Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of the Vice President: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 136 (1964) (statement of Herbert Brownell, Jr.).
63. S. REP. NO. 89–66, at 13 (1965); S. REP. NO. 88-1382, at 11 (1964).
64. H.R. REP. NO. 89–203, at 13 (1965).
65. Goldstein, supra note 58, at 990.
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Brownell shared essentially the same insight the following year in a law
review article 61 and repeated the idea several times in the 1960s when he
testified before both houses of Congress 62 as it moved to propose what became the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. His observation was included without
attribution in the committee reports in the Senate63 and House of Representatives 64 related to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
Brownell’s comment suggested three fundamental insights regarding
how a constitutional democracy can encourage decision-makers to act as patriots, not as partisans, when facing difficult questions about who should exercise presidential power. First, constitutional provisions are not selfexecuting but depend upon human agency. The concept that the United
States is “a government of laws, not people,” is not entirely accurate to the
extent it suggests that laws can function appropriately independent of human
behavior. On the contrary, public officials and citizens can frustrate the enforcement of, and can undermine, law by indifference or malevolence. The
rule of law depends on the faithful and conscientious conduct of human beings. Second, constitutional provisions depend on decision-makers being responsible officials, not rogues or opportunists who would subordinate duty
to partisan advantage. And finally, public opinion, based on a citizenry committed to “constitutional morality,” provides the ultimate check in a democracy. If officials misbehave or if they put personal or partisan advantage over
constitutional principle, a democracy empowers—and indeed depends
upon—the people to throw the rascals out.
Presidential disability decision-making, the context in which Brownell
offered his insight, bears some resemblance to presidential impeachment.
The two represent the only constitutional remedies for separating a President
from the powers and duties of his office before his term ends. 65 In the case
of impeachment, the President is divested of his office and perhaps precluded
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from holding any public office under the national government. In the case of
presidential disability, the President retains office, but the powers and duties
of the presidency are transferred to the Vice President for the period of the
incapacity, which could be temporary, uncertain, or permanent. 66 Impeachment is initiated and tried in the respective houses of Congress, and the Vice
President’s interest in the outcome is reason for disqualifying him as the presiding officer over the trial. In presidential inability decision-making, the
Vice President is a necessary participant.67
Brownell’s insight regarding presidential inability decision-making applies equally to the predicament of the President’s co-partisans during an
impeachment trial. Both remedies empower presidential co-partisans to assess in different ways the President’s fitness. And just as Brownell’s comment assumed that decision-makers would place national well-being over
partisan commitments in determining whether a President was unable to discharge presidential powers and duties, so, too, impeachment presented a similar imperative. The “integrity” or “conscience” of each senator was critical
in ensuring the impartiality of senators who were hostile to or sympathetic
to the President,68 but those traits were most important regarding the President’s supporters due to the absence of other external restraints on their behavior.
III. THE EXPULSION PROCEEDINGS REGARDING SENATOR HARRISON
WILLIAMS
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66. Id.
67. Id.
68. BLACK, supra note 16, at 11.
69. GERHARDT, supra note 19, at 78–79 (explaining that senators and members of the House of
Representatives are not subject to impeachment).
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish
its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.”).
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Although our constitutional system presents no precise analogy to a
presidential impeachment trial, the Senate’s decision whether to expel a fellow member bears some resemblance. Although members of Congress are
not subject to impeachment and removal,69 they are subject to expulsion by
their respective houses. 70 Both constitutional proceedings involve determinations on whether a public official’s conduct justifies removal, both decisions are entrusted to the Senate, and both situations require some senators
to assess the conduct of a co-partisan. A Senate expulsion proceeding may
not have the visibility of a presidential impeachment trial, yet it is more likely
to require senators to judge a colleague and perhaps a friend.
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The expulsion proceedings of Senator Harrison Williams (D. N.J.) in
March of 1982 occasioned political leadership consistent with the constitutional morality that Brownell described. In brief, Williams had been caught
in a sting operation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in which he had
agreed to provide political favors in exchange for loans from an agent posing
as an Arab sheik to a titanium mining company in which he had a secret
interest. 71 Williams was convicted on nine felony counts in May 1981, after
which the Senate Ethics Committee embarked on an investigation of Williams, found his behavior “ethically repugnant,” and recommended his removal. 72 Williams denied a criminal motive and claimed entrapment. 73
Before the Senate, Williams was represented by the highly respected Senator
Daniel Inouye (D. HI), who argued that senators had only been expelled for
treason. 74 Senate Minority Whip, Alan Cranston (D. CA), pressed for limiting Williams’s sanction to a censure rather than expulsion. 75 The Democrats
had lost control of the Senate in 1980 in the Reagan landslide for the first
time since 1955. 76 Williams had been elected to the Senate four times. 77 New
Jersey’s Governor, Thomas Kean, was a Republican and could be expected
to name a Republican to fill Williams’s seat should it become vacant,78
thereby swelling the Republicans 53-47 margin.
The turning point in the expulsion proceedings came when Eagleton
rose to respond to Inouye and Cranston. Eagleton described the expulsion
proceeding as “the most distasteful aspect of service in the U.S. Senate.” 79
Eagleton and Williams had been colleagues for thirteen years, during which
time they had served together on the Committee on Labor and Human Resources and had similar political philosophies.80 Eagleton described himself
42699-ckt_95-2 Sheet No. 21 Side B
11/23/2020 10:40:39

71. The Expulsion Case of Harrison A. Williams, Jr. (1982), U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/expulsion_cases/140HarrisonWilliams_expulsion.htm (last visited May 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/829Y-4VHQ].
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm
76. Party
Division,
U.S.
[https://perma.cc/W58G-QV7S] (showing Democrats achieved Senate majority in 1955 and held it until
1981).
77. Douglas Martin, Ex-Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr., 81, Dies; Went to Prison Over Abscam
Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/20/nyregion/ex-senator-harrison-a-williams-jr-81-dies-went-to-prison-over-abscam-scandal.html [https://perma.cc/J2N8-QZYH].
78. Joel K. Goldstein, Placing principle over partisan advantage, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH (Nov.
27, 2018), https://www.stltoday.com/opinion/columnists/placing-principle-above-partisan-advantage/article_8095dbc9-f507-5733-8375-f795b20477d5.html [https://perma.cc/EWS9-TNST].
79. 128 CONG. REC. 3645 (1982).
80. Id.
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81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 3646.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., id. at 3815 (remarks of Sen. Leahy) (citing Eagleton in rejecting censure as a remedy);
id. at 3974 (remarks of Sen. Wallop) (sharing Eagleton’s conclusion that it would be inappropriate to
allow Williams to remain in Senate); id. at 3983 (remarks of Sen. Hatch) (associating himself with Eagleton’s reasoning); id. at 4006 (remarks of Sen. Heflin) (referring to Eagleton’s “powerful and eloquent
remarks”); id. at 3981 (remarks of Sen. Cranston) (referring to Eagleton’s comments).
91. 128 CONG. REC. 3978 (1982).
92. 132 CONG. REC. 28,830 (1986).
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as the “showcase liberal on the Ethics Committee.”81 Eagleton saluted Williams’s accomplishments, stating that few senators in history could claim the
legislative contributions of Williams or could match his record of having
helped millions.82 Notwithstanding the “heavy hearts” in the Senate over the
Williams situation, these factors made Eagleton’s “a shade heavier than
some.” 83
Yet Eagleton could not excuse Williams’s behavior or explain it more
charitably. Williams had received outstanding legal representation at every
stage of the proceeding.84 But the videotapes of his conduct provided the
smoking gun, indeed a smoking machine gun, Eagleton said, of his “gross
misconduct.” 85
Eagleton rejected the argument that Williams’s misconduct could be
excused. “If nontreasonous behavior be the sole benchmark of fitness to
serve in this body, then one must ask how fit is this body in which we
serve?” 86 In response to the argument that Williams’s fate could befall any
of the senators, Eagleton asked his colleagues to consider whether they
would have “engaged in this tawdry, greedy enterprise” and, if they would
have, he suggested they serve out their term “and passively fade into deserved oblivion.” 87 “Williams ha[s] not had the good grace and good judgment” to resign from the Senate. 88 “We should not perpetrate our own
disgrace by asking him to stay.” 89
Eagleton’s eloquent remarks affected his colleagues. 90 Senator Alan
Simpson (R. Wyo.) referred to “the powerful statement of Tom Eagleton—
whose remarks sucked all the air out of this Chamber the other evening. Powerful stuff, indeed.” 91 “I do not know when the Williams case began, but I
do know when it ended. It ended with Tom Eagleton’s speech,” said Senator
Ernest “Fritz” Hollings (D. S.C.). 92
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128 CONG. REC. 3816 (1982).
Id. at 3817.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4004.
Id. at 4003 (remarks of Sen. Williams); id. at 4004 (letter of resignation of Sen. Williams).
Id. at 4004.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4005.
Id.
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93.
94.
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96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
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Eagleton was not the only senator who put patriotic duty over partisan
and personal considerations. The day after Eagleton’s speech, New Jersey’s
junior senator, Bill Bradley, risked alienating Williams’s New Jersey allies
by speaking out in favor of his expulsion. Williams had helped Bradley adjust to the Senate, 93 but Williams had accepted bribes and “[b]ribery inverts
and mocks the democratic process, turning it upon itself,” Bradley said.94
The issue was not a “minor one” but went to the “core of democratic government—the faith people extend to political institutions.”95 Bradley would
vote to expel his fellow New Jersey Democrat. 96 Indeed, Bradley’s performance was judged by Senator Howell Heflin (D. Ala.) to be “a remarkable
profile in courage not seen in this Chamber in many years” especially since
other senators had recently recused themselves when a senator from their
state was accused of an ethical impropriety. 97
Seeing the inevitable result after Eagleton’s remarks, Williams resigned
on March 11, 1982. 98 Senator Malcolm Wallop (R. Wyo.), the Ethics Committee chair, noted that the Senate had “passed through yet another of the
innumerable gates of history . . . with compassion, courage, and a sense of
honor.” 99 The debate had demonstrated instances of senators’ “personal
courage, putting our honor above friendship, our institution above politics.” 100 The Senate “collectively ha[d] risen to the demand thrust upon it.” 101
Heflin rejected the idea that the Senate would have been better had Williams
resigned earlier. The debate had made the Senate and America stronger by
forcing all to come to grips with the ethical questions raised.102 Wallop felt
moved to add that there had been “no victors, no vanquished, but the Senate
stands proud, and it should, in its own eyes and in the eyes of the public in
dealing with the trust thrust upon it by the Constitution, a trust which could
not and ought not to have been passed to any other entity.”103 Although none
of its members had enjoyed the experience, “if there was a winner in all of
this, a winner as an institution. . .the Senate measured up to what the American people ought to expect.” 104
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IV. THE TRUMP IMPEACHMENT TRIAL

The president asked a foreign government to investigate his political rival.
The president withheld vital military funds from that government to press
it to do so. The president delayed funds for an American ally at war with

11/23/2020 10:40:39

105. 116 CONG. REC. S937 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 2020).
106. Id. at S938.
107. Id. at S897 (daily ed. (statement of Sen. Mitt Romney).
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The same could not be said regarding the performance of the Senate
majority 38 years later in its conduct of the Trump impeachment trial. There
was little to indicate that many members of the Senate majority displayed the
“constitutional morality” that their role required during the Trump impeachment trial. Unlike Eagleton and Bradley, who focused on constitutional and
institutional concerns, rather than partisan loyalties, in favoring expulsion of
their co-partisan Williams, few members of the Senate majority gave much
appearance of impartial judgment. Only one, Senator Mitt Romney (R.
Utah), voted to convict President Trump105 on one of the two counts 106 notwithstanding overwhelming evidence of an egregious abuse of official
power.
The facts regarding the Trump impeachment and trial are well-known
to contemporary audiences such that no lengthy recitation is needed here,
nor does space permit one. In essence, according to testimony from various
witnesses, Trump orchestrated an effort, through his own activities and that
of government and non-government officials, to persuade President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine to announce an investigation into former Vice
President Joe Biden and his son, Hunter, by withholding security assistance
Congress had appropriated for Ukraine as well as other signs of American
support. At the time, Biden was widely perceived as Trump’s strongest Democratic rival in the 2020 election. Although Trump directed government officials not to comply with subpoenas to testify or to produce relevant
documents, some government officials provided evidence of the conduct of
Trump and others allegedly acting at his direction. Trump ultimately released
the aid for Ukraine, but only after a whistleblower’s complaint became public, thereby alerting Trump and his associates to the need to minimize the
damage from the scheme.
Senator Romney concluded that Trump’s interest in having Ukraine investigate the Bidens was a “political pursuit” and that his interest in having
them investigated was dependent on their names being Biden. Trump’s behavior was “so extreme and so egregious that it rises to the level of a high
crime and misdemeanor,” 107 Romney concluded. He continued:
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Russian invaders. The president’s purpose was personal and political. Accordingly, the president is guilty of an appalling abuse of public trust.
What he did was not perfect. No, it was a flagrant assault on our electoral
rights, our national security and our fundamental values. Corrupting an
election to keep oneself in office is perhaps the most abusive and destructive violation of one’s oath of office that I can imagine. 108

11/23/2020 10:40:39

108. Id.
109. 116 CONG. REC. S806 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 2020) (statement of Sen. Lisa Murkowski).
110. Id. at S807 (statement of Sen. Todd Young).
111. See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. S841 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 2020) (statement of Sen. Susan Collins).
112. Id. at S841–42.
113. See, e.g., id. at S844 (statement of Sen. Robert Portman).
114. 116 CONG. REC. S878 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 2020) (statement of Sen. Lamar Alexander).
115. Id. at S911 (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley).
116. 116 CONG. REC. S815 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 2020) (statement of Sen. John Thune).
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Some of Romney’s Republican colleagues also expressed serious misgivings about Trump’s conduct yet did not believe it constituted an impeachable offense. Senator Lisa Murkowski (R. Alaska) recognized that “[t]he
President’s behavior was shameful and wrong. His personal interests do not
take precedence over those of this great Nation.” 109 Senator Todd Young (R.
Ind.) voted for acquittal but went out of his way to “pointedly emphasize
what I am not arguing, that a President can lawfully do ‘whatever he wants,’
that inviting foreign election interference is appropriate, that absolute immunity attaches to Executive Privilege, or that a statutory offense must be
committed to impeach.” 110 Senator Susan Collins (R. Me.) concluded that “it
was clear” that Trump’s call for an investigation into the Bidens’ activities
during the July 25 call “was improper and demonstrated very poor judgment.” 111 Collins said it was wrong for Trump to mention the Bidens and
request an investigation of a political rival.112 Senator Rob Portman (R.
Ohio) agreed that it was “inappropriate and wrong” for Trump to ask Zelensky to investigate Vice President Biden during the July 25 call and that it was
“inappropriate” for administration members and private individuals to act to
delay assistance to Ukraine pending an investigation. 113 Senator Lamar Alexander (R. Tenn.) also concluded that “it was inappropriate” for Trump “to
ask a foreign leader to investigate his political opponent and to withhold U.S.
aid to encourage this investigation.” 114 Senator Charles Grassley (R. Iowa)
emphasized that he did not believe Trump’s conduct was “above reproach.” 115 Senator John Thune (R. S.D.) acknowledged that Trump’s “judgment” regarding his Ukraine conduct could fairly be debated and recognized
the possibility that “his actions were inappropriate” but did not believe they
constituted high crimes and misdemeanors. 116
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117. Maggie Haberman and Michael S. Schmidt, Trump Tied Ukraine Aid to Inquiries He Sought,
Bolton Book Says, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/26/us/politics/trumpbolton-book-ukraine.html [https://perma.cc/VKF4-ZAGL].
118. See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. S799 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 2020) (statement of Sen. James Inhofe) (describing House allegations as “secondhand” and complaining of lack of “direct” evidence).
119. 116 CONG. REC. S877 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 2020) (statement of Sen. Lamar Alexander).
120. See, e.g., Rosalind S. Helderman and Josh Dawsey, In new book, Bolton belatedly says Trump
attempted to use military aid to pressure Ukraine on political investigations, WASH. POST (June 17, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-new-book-bolton-belatedly-says-trump-attempted-to-usemilitary-aid-to-pressure-ukraine-on-political-investigations/2020/06/17/06ed56ce-af32-11ea-8f5663f38c990077_story.html [https://perma.cc/CU8N-8UH9].
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It is, of course, often difficult to ascribe motives to officials, and perhaps many of the majority members acted based on their good faith assessments in concluding that Trump’s behavior did not merit conviction and
removal. Yet some aspects of the behavior of many in the Senate majority
seemed troubling. The majority repeatedly rejected efforts to hear any evidence, including from Trump’s former National Security Adviser, John Bolton, who offered to testify and who, according to contemporary reports, had
written in his then forthcoming memoir that Trump had told him in July of
2019 that he wanted to continue withholding the aid from Ukraine until
Ukrainian officials responded favorably regarding the Biden investigations. 117 Such an assertion from a high-ranking presidential associate would
seem to provide direct evidence to support the House managers’ assertion of
a quid pro quo, and one might have expected an impartial judge to have wondered what context and additional evidence Bolton might provide. Yet on
numerous occasions, the majority senators overwhelmingly rejected motions
to call Bolton rather than hear evidence which would embarrass the Republican President.
Having refused to hear Bolton’s evidence, some based their votes to
acquit in part on the absence of direct evidence that Trump withheld military
aid in exchange for an investigation of the Bidens,118 the precise evidence
Bolton seemed prepared to provide. Although some Senate Republicans had
defended Trump by denying the existence of any evidence that tied Trump
to the arms-for-Bidens “favor,” Senator Lamar Alexander (R. Tenn.) dismissed Bolton’s testimony as simply corroborating what was already known.
Senator Alexander said there was no need for more evidence that Trump had
asked Zelensky to investigate the Bidens and had withheld military aid at
least partly to “pressure” Ukraine to investigate the Bidens.119 More recently,
the availability of Bolton’s memoir confirmed reports that it claimed that
Trump had withheld $400 million security assistance from Ukraine until it
provided information that would damage his rivals and help him politically. 120
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121. See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. S841 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 2020) (statement of Sen. Susan Collins).
122. See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. S806 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 2020) (statement of Sen. Lisa Murkowski);
116 CONG. REC. S814 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 2020) (statement of Sen. Mitch McConnell); id. at S816 (statement of Sen. John Thune); id. at S817 (statement of Sen. Joni Ernst); id. at S818 (statement of Sen. Roger
Wicker); id. at S826 (statement of Sen. Shelley Capito); id. at S835 (statement of Sen. Steven Daines);
id. at S844–45 (remarks of Sen. Rob Portman; cf. 116 CONG. REC. at S796 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 2020) (statement of Sen. Marsha Blackburn) (complaining that Democrats were trying to prelitigate the 2020 election).
123. See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. S817 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 2020) (remarks of Sen. Joni Ernst).
124. 116 CONG. REC. S897 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 2020) (statement of Sen. Mitt Romney).
125. GERHARDT, supra note 19, at 80–81.
126. See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. S817 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 2020) (statement of Sen. Joni Ernst).
127. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
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Other justifications also were troubling. Senator Collins claimed that
the Framers “recognized” that if the Senate removed a sitting President, it
would be acting against the voters who elected him or her,121 an assertion
that was at best an inelegant statement since there is no reason to believe that
voters who elected a President would wish him or her to retain office if guilty
of offenses justifying conviction and removal. Presumably, the Framers
thought that impeachment would allow the people’s representatives to vindicate democratic, noncorrupt government by acting to expose and sanction
offenses that occurred or were discovered after election. They would not
have provided impeachment as a remedy against presidential and vice-presidential misconduct unless they thought sometimes elected officials should
be removed in that manner. Some majority senators argued that convicting
President Trump would deprive the American people of the right to make
their own decision in November 122 and that the impeachment process reflected a distrust of the American people. 123 Senator Mitt Romney pointed
out correctly that the Constitution rejects that argument since it invests the
power of trying impeachments in the Senate, not the voters.124 Moreover,
removal and disqualification from holding further office are distinct punishments, and whereas the former follows from a conviction the latter must be
separately imposed. 125 Accordingly, the Senate could have removed Trump
from office yet not disqualified him from holding further office. That might
not have been an appealing prospect for Republican officials who did not
want to weaken their party’s standard-bearer, yet that consideration should
not motivate an impartial decision-maker. Some suggested that Trump’s behavior was not an appropriate basis for impeachment because it related to
foreign policy. 126 Yet that logic cannot reflect the meaning of a Constitution
that makes impeachment and removal appropriate for treason and which imposes the constraints of the Foreign Emoluments Clause.127 Others complained that it was inappropriate for the Senate to act as a factfinder in an
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128. See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. S825 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 2020) (statement of Sen. Deb Fischer); id. at
S834 (statement of Sen. David Perdue) (stating that the Senate is charged with ruling based on the evidence the House produces).
129. 116 CONG. REC. S791 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 2020) (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley).
130. Id. at S796 (statement of Sen. Blackburn).
131. 116 CONG. REC. S813–14 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 2020) (statement of Sen. Mitch McConnell) (claiming Democrats impeached Trump for defeating Hillary Clinton).
132. Id. at S804 (statement of Sen. Kelly Loeffler).
133. RICHARD M. NIXON, THE MEMOIRS OF RICHARD NIXON 1067 (1978).
134. Id. at 1073.
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impeachment proceeding,128 an anomalous understanding of such a proceeding. Senator Charles Grassley complained that the House’s case turned on
Trump’s motive and suggested that such a subjective inquiry was inappropriate.129 Yet in law and politics, motive is often dispositive. Some senators
protested that they lacked information about the anonymous whistleblower
whose complaint effectively initiated the process130 without acknowledging
that the whistleblower’s identity is irrelevant since his or her allegations had
all been corroborated by witnesses with knowledge. Many senators seemed
to be uttering talking points, 131 and various speeches were laden with political comments. 132
The majority party’s support for Trump stands in marked contrast to the
behavior of Senate Republicans nearly fifty years ago during the impeachment proceedings directed against President Richard M. Nixon relating
largely to his participation in covering up the involvement of persons associated with his re-election campaign with the break-in at the Democratic
headquarters at the Watergate. The Court-ordered release of some incriminating tapes made clear that Nixon participated in the Watergate cover-up
beginning less than a week after the break-in. Nixon received reports from
his staff 133 and from Republican legislative leaders 134 that the House would
impeach him and the Senate would convict him with virtually all Republicans abandoning him. Nixon elected to resign instead.
I suspect that many, myself included, who agree with Senator Romney
that Trump committed “high crimes and misdemeanors” for which he should
have been convicted, view Trump’s misconduct as worse than Nixon’s.
Whereas both Nixon and Trump acted to undermine the operation of the
democratic process, Trump’s behavior was a particularly egregious abuse of
constitutional principles because he subordinated America’s national security and that of an ally to advance his electoral fortunes. I suspect that
Trump’s supporters may have seen the issue quite differently if a recent
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135. Cf. 116 CONG. REC. S790 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 2020) (statement of Sen. Martin Heinrich) (noting
that Nixon’s co-partisans deserted him, whereas Trump’s had not).
136. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII (“No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than
twice, and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two years
of a term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of President
more than once . . . .”).
137. Presidential Approval Ratings—Gallup Historical Statistics and Trends,
https://news.gallup.com/poll/116677/presidential-approval-ratings-gallup-historical-statisticstrends.aspx [https://perma.cc/8W28-K4QX].
138. How Senators Voted on Trump’s Impeachment, POLITICO (Feb. 5, 2020),
https://www.politico.com/interactives/2019/trump-impeachment-vote-count-senate-results/
(showing
senators who voted to acquit Trump and how their states voted in 2016) [https://perma.cc/ZJ7D-ZJNU].
139. Id. (showing states of senators who voted to acquit Trump).
140. Pious, supra note 19, at 899.
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Democratic President had behaved as Trump did. Why, then, did Trump’s
Senate co-partisans support him whereas Nixon’s abandoned him? 135
Nixon, of course, resigned to escape impeachment during his second
term when the Twenty-Second Amendment 136 barred him from seeking reelection, whereas Trump was impeached in his first term as he prepared to
seek re-election. Yet it is possible that co-partisans might be more eager to
rid themselves of an unpopular first-term president rather than run and (possibly) serve with him again. More likely, Trump benefitted from the retained
loyalty of his base, and his approval ratings, of about 40%, exceeded Nixon’s
at the end. 137 Moreover, most of Trump’s Senate support was from majority
senators from small red states where Trump remained popular, whereas the
less ideological parties in Nixon’s day produced Republican senators in
some competitive states. Some 50 of the 52 senators who voted to acquit
Trump came from states he won in 2016. 138 Some 43 of his 52 votes came
from 22 states where Republicans held both Senate seats.139 The loyalty of
Trump’s base may have led some Republican senators to fear that bucking
him would produce a primary challenge or alienate their partisan constituency.
More than two decades ago, Richard Pious recognized the role of public
opinion in shaping impeachment outcomes. He observed that “there is a common law of impeachment that derives from the common sense of the public,
and will then likely be reflected back into the House and Senate.” 140
In fact, democracy envisions a continuing dialogue between representatives and those represented. Senators will be attuned to popular opinion in
their states, especially that of the constituents to whom they look to sustain
them in office, yet they also have a responsibility to shape that opinion by
vindicating constitutional norms. Brownell’s concept of political morality
assumed a virtuous public whose attentive opinion would provide incentive
to decision makers to vindicate constitutional norms and the public interest
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even when those values counseled rebuking a co-partisan. It also envisioned
decision makers who would act with constitutional morality, as Eagleton and
Bradley did, even when such behavior ran counter to their partisan interests.
Ultimately, the perpetuation of constitutional norms will depend upon a public committed to constitutional morality and public officials who are willing
to act as Senator Romney did, notwithstanding the political consequences.
The Founders hoped that the Senate would fulfill that expectation in
conducting an impeachment trial. In 2020, the majority let them down.
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